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No. 6

THE LOUISVILLE BAR FORTY-SEVEN YEARS AGO.
By I. Polk Johnson.
I have been asked by the Editor of the Kentucky Law Journal
to give some reminiscences of the judges of the courts of Jefferson
county at the time when I came to the bar, forty-seven years ago. The
task is approached with hesitancy for the reason that the writer of
reminiscences is usually classed with the superannuated who are
worthless for other purposes, a classification, I trust, which is not
applicable in this instance, as, at this time, I am actively engaged
in public pursuits. I was admitted to the bar in Louisville in 1869
and there are now but three others in practice who were then engaged
in the profession. These are Judge Theodore L. Burnett, Judge
rontaine T. Fox and Mr. Charles B. Seymour. Judge Burnett is" one
of the very few veterans of the war with Mexico yet living and his
erect figure, despite his age, and his sunny temperament give promise
of yet many years of life in which he will continue as an exemplar
of the high virtues of the typical Kentuckian of the old school. During the War between the States, Judge Burnett worthily represented
a Kentucky district in the Congress of the Confederate States, and
for years after the conclusion of that war served acceptably as Corporation Counsel of the city of Louisville. Judge Itox came naturally
to the bar and the bench, being the son of a lawyer and a judge. He
served a term as Vice-Chancellor and after the abolishment of that
court, returned to active practice, in which he is still engaged. In his
hours of recreation, his mind turns to literary pursuits and he is the
author of several works of a politico-historical character. His particular aversion is Alexander Hamilton, in whose character he sees
no virtues but a long catalogue of political and personal sins. Mr.
Charles B. Seymour is the student of the Louisville bar, an able
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lawyer and a modest, courteous gentleman. He is said to have
mastered the Persian language and is probably the only man in
Louisville who can read old Omar in the original.
In 1869 the principal courts of Jefferson county were presided
over by Judge Horatio W. Bruce of the Circuit Court; Judge Henry
J. Stites of the Court of Common Pleas, and Judge Thomas B.
Cochran of the Chancery Court. Today six judges perform the
duties to which these three were then assigned.
Judge Bruce was a member of the Louisville bar at the beginning of the war in 1861, his partner being Ben Hardin Helm, elder
son of Governor John L. Helm, whose daughter Judge Bruce had
married. Mr. Helm, a graduate of West Point, attached himself early
in the war to the Confederate cause, becoming Colonel of the Virst
Kentucky Cavalry, in which regiment I had the honor to serve. He
bad declined a commission in the United States Army tendered by
Mr. Lincoln, who had married Miss Mary Todd, a half sister of
Mrs. Helm. Early in the war Colonel Helm was promoted to
Brigadier General, was painfully wounded at the battle of Baton
Rouge, La., and at the battle of Chickamauga, September 2o, 1863,
died the soldier's glorious death at the head of Kentucky's Immortal
Orphan Bridage, which he led in the tremendous struggle.
Judge Bruce was elected a member from Kentucky in the Confederate Congress in whfich he ably served until the Confederacy
ceased to exist, save as a holy memory to those who had followed
its stainless colors to the end. Returning to his home in Louisville
and engaging again in, the practice of his profession, he speedily
attracted the attention of the then dominant party and was elected
Judge of the Circuit district, then composed, if memory is not at
fault, of the counties of Jefferson, Shelby, Oldham, Spencer and
Bullitt. After serving with credit and to. the satisfaction of- the
bar and the people for several years, he resigned to become Chancelor,
vice Judge Cochran, deceased, the duties of which court accorded
more particularly with the bent of his mind than the arduous and
burdensome requirements of the Circuit bench. After a service as
Chancellor, which increased the esteem in which he was held by the
bar and the public, Judge Bruce resigned to become the Chief Counsel
of the Louisville and Nashville railroad in the service of which he
remained until his death, long afterward.
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When Judge Bruce resigned from Circuit Judgeship, there were
numerous applications for the succession. I was at that time a
member of the Legislature from Jefferson county, and a friend of
General William L. Jackson, who sought the appointment from the
Governor. General Jackson had come to Louisville from Virginia
soon after the war, in which he had attained the rank of BrigadierGeneral. Before the war he had been a Circuit Judge and LieutenantGovernor of Virginia. He requested Colonel Phil. Lee, then Prosecuting Attorney of the Circuit Court, and myself to go to Vrankfort and
see Governor Leslie in his behalf, with which request we complied.
In the conference with Governor Leslie, that fine old gentleman
surprised us both by tendering the appointment to Colonel Lee.
That gentleman, after recovering from his surprise, positively declined to be considered for the position saying: "Why Governor, if
I were a Circuit Judge the State would have to enlarge that grim
old prison down there by the Mansion where you live. I have been
a prosecuting Attorney so long that I have come to believe that every
man who is indicted is guilty and if I were a judge I would fill that
old prison so full that -half the inmates would be sleeping in the open
air for lack of cell room."
The Governor then told us that he would appoint General Jackson,
which he did on the following day. Judge Jackson acceptably presided over the Circuit Court until his death and was succeeded by his
son, William L. Jackson, Jr., a very able young man who died all too
soon, but not before he had proven himself an able successor of his
father.
Judge Henry J. Stites, of the Common Pleas Court, was one of
those genial spirits to know whom, was a delight. No young lawyer
ever appeared in his court who did not come to admire and love him.
They could almost admit that his decisions were correct, though
adverse to the clients they represented. I recall my first appearance
in his court when he addressed me as "Mr. Stranger." I at once
expressed my regret that I appeared strange to him with the hope
that my future appearances in his court would be so frequent that he
would recognize rAe by my own name. A brother member of the bar,
entering into the spirit of the occasion, formally, introduced me to the
Judge, somewhat to the embarrassment of each of us. After this,
when. appearing in his court, he punctili6usly called my name cor-
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rectly. Off the bench and in these prohibition days, may it be said
that at another style of bar he never failed to address me as "Mr.
Stranger." Judge Stites, as all Kentucky lawyers know, had served
with distinction on the bench of the Court of Appeals before coming
from Hopkinsville to Louisville, after the war. I have an impression
that he was one among the many Kentuckians whom the exigencies
of the war drove into Canadian exile.
After I had gone from the practice of law into the more
attractive field of journalism the friendship between the elderly
judge and my then youthful self continued and it was his habit, when
opportunity presented, to come into my office and charm me with
recitals of his early experiences at the bar and elsewhere. One of
these experiences may be mentioned here, as related by Judge Stites.
The Editor of the Democratic newspaper at Hopkinsville, having
occasion to be absent for some time, secured the services of young
lawyer Stites to edit his paper during his absence. Singularly enough
the editor of the Whig paper was called away at the same time, and
he too, secured Mr. Stites to edit his paper, profoundly ignorant of
the fact that he was at the same time the editor pro tem of the Democratic paper. Then the fun began. The Democratic Editor attacked
the Whig Editor in the most outrageous manner. The Whig Editor
came back in like style and the readers of each, during the merry
war, which continued for several weeks, were duly excited and constantly expected a personal encounter between the two Editors, the
absence of each of whom from the town seeming to have been overlooked. Finally the tvo Editors returned and were at first astounded
and later amused at the antics of their substitute Editors. Judge
Stites enjoyed the relation of this incident, and at its conclusion,
with an air of deep regret, said: "And do you know, Stranger,
neither of those Editors ever again wanted me to edit his paper."
I am safe in the assertion that no Judge of any court in Louisville ever enjoyed greater affection from the bar and the public alike,
than did the venerable Judge Stites, whose passing into the Great
Beyond touched the tenderest chords of the hearts of the people, whom
he had so long and so faithfully served.
Chancellor Thomas B. Cochran was a dignified, quiet gentleman,
with a well-stored legal mind which fitted him for the important duties
of his court. He was in ill health when I came to the bar and did not
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long survive. He had been an officer of Kentucky Volunteers in the
Federal Army during the war, serving with that distinguished gallantry which marked the conduct of most Kentuckians in each of the
armies engaged in that mighty struggle. When the Emancipation
Proclamation was issued by President Lincoln, he tendered his resignation from the army and returned to his home. Some time afterwards he was elected Chancellor.
I recall with some trepidation even now, my first interview with
Chancellor Cochran and recognize now, as I did not then, my great
lack of knowledge of the law, of court procedure and legal ethics. I
had filed a bill for divorce for one of my first clients; proof had been
taken before the Commissioner and the cause duly submitted. The.
summer recess of the courts drew nearer and no decree had been
rendered in the, to me, most important cause pending before the
Chancellor. I wanted to win that case of course, and I wanted to
win it at the earliest jossible moment. I also wanted my fee. As a
matter of serious fact, I needed that fee. Observing the Chancellor
leaving the court-house one day, I tremblingly approached him and
related that there was a. certain suit for a divorce which had been
submitted to him; one in which I felt a vital interest as I had filed the
bill. I managed to tell him that it was the first cause I had brought
in the Chancery Court, omitting to state that it was also the only one.
I referred to the rapidly approaching recess and my fear that a
decision might not be rendered and would the Chancellor permit a
request for a decision before the court went into recess. I recall with
a degree of pleasure that I had the grace to apologize for my request
which was wholly irregular.
The kindly Chancellor, doubtless
recalling the days when he was a struggling young lawyer and probably did not know much more law than I did, asked for the style of
the suit and promised to give it attention before the recess began.
At the next setting of the Chancellor, a decree was entered in favor of
my client, and I collected my fee at a time when few other worldly
things were so much needed. Though long divorced from all efforts
to practice law, the memory of that fee does not give me half the
pleasure as does the reflection that I won that cause and that the
Chancellor, ignoring my ignorance and imprudence, if you will have
it so, overlooked both and brought in the decree earlier than he might
have done, had I not thrown legal ethics to the winds.
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Peace to his soul and to those others, his associates, of whom I
have written here, to each of whom, I, in common with all the then
young members of the bar of Louisville, owe a debt of gratitude for
manifold kindnesses and a gracious ignoring of the errors we committed, so far as it was possible for them to do so. There may have
been greater judges than Horatio W. Bruce, Henry J. Stites and
Thomas B. Cochran, but I have yet to meet upon the bench or in the
profession kinder or more gentle spirits. May the bench of Kentucky
in the coming years know others of their kind is the heartfelt wish of
the writer to whom the lengthening shadows bring the knowledge that
he who in other years appeared before them, must soon stand before
another Judge, a just one, from whose decrees there is no appeal, but
in whom all kindness resides.
PATRIOTISM
"Patriotism: Love and devotion to one's country; the spirit that
originating in love of country, prompts to obedience to its laws,
to the support and defense of its existence, rights, and institutions,
and to the promotion of its welfare."--New Standard Dictionary.
The act being staged before our eyes, the spectacle of our people
being divided upon a national and vital issue, dissension over the
carrying into effect of a policy logically, legally, morally right is, while
ludicrous, deplorable. The honor of the nation is at stake. The
foundation, mortised by patriots's blood, of our republic is endangered.
That sacred heritage of liberty bequeathed us by our fore-fathers is
in peril.
The fallacious theory, born of a false sense of patriotism, misconception of duty, fostered by the "peace at any price" men, advocated by ambitious and unscrupulous politicians, that in order to
maintain neutrality we must surrender our rights is absurd, a doctrine
untenable, a principle unsound. The effect of the adoption and
enforcement of such a measure is obvious. Destructive of national
respect, injurious to freedom, essentially subservient, demoralizing,
it would be a sure fore-runner of rebellious bedlam, a fire-brand in
the hand .of Mars.

